26 July 2007

Intelligence and Security Report on Rendition Published

The Intelligence and Security Committee, Chaired by Torfaen MP Paul Murphy, yesterday released its report on rendition.

The report is available to download at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/, or you can follow the link from the links page of Paul Murphy's website. In looking at the issue of rendition - the contraversial moving of suspected terrorists from one state to another by US Authorities - it examines issues like the intelligence relationship between the UK and US Agencies.

You may also wish to read about the reporting of and reaction to the report - for example at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6915652.stm
or
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/peter_riddell/article2141407.ece


On the release of the report, Paul Murphy MP commented:

“There has, rightly, been a great deal of concern expressed about possible UK involvement in the U.S. rendition programme. Our Report looks at whether the UK security and intelligence agencies had any knowledge of, or involvement in, U.S. rendition operations. In conducting our inquiry we have questioned the heads of the UK Agencies and Government Ministers. We have spoken to Liberty, Amnesty International, Andrew Tyrie MP, Chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, lawyers and journalists, and also our U.S. counterparts."

“Our inquiry has not been helped by the fact that Government departments have had such difficulty in establishing the facts from their own records in relation to requests to conduct renditions through UK airspace. This is a matter of fundamental liberty, and we recommend that the Government ensure that proper searchable records are kept in the future."

The Committee concludes that:

There is no evidence of any UK Agency being directly involved in the U.S. rendition programme, including any “Extraordinary Renditions”.

There was however one case where a UK Agency was indirectly, and inadvertently, involved in a “Rendition to Detention”. This case is that of Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna. This was the first case where the U.S. conducted a “Rendition to Detention” of individuals entirely unrelated to the conflict in Afghanistan. We examined this case in great detail. We found that the Security Service correctly shared routine background intelligence with foreign intelligence services, but that this may have indirectly triggered the arrest and subsequent “Rendition to Detention” of Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna. However we are satisfied that the Service did not intend for the men to be arrested or for a “Rendition to Detention” operation to take place – indeed when sharing the intelligence they used caveats specifically prohibiting any action being taken. The Security Service did not foresee that the U.S. authorities would disregard the caveats, given that they had honoured the caveat system for the past 20 years. This case shows a lack of regard on the part of the U.S. for UK concerns – despite strong protests - and that has serious implications for the intelligence relationship.

Overall, SIS and the Security Service were slow to appreciate this change in U.S. rendition policy. We have noted that our Agencies were under considerable pressure at the time – the focus was, of necessity, on day to day issues rather than the bigger picture – and there was a great deal of “tough talk” being used by the U.S. We nevertheless consider that the Agencies should have detected the emerging pattern of renditions sooner and used greater caution in working with the U.S. at an earlier stage. We have criticised them for this in our report.

In fighting international terrorism it is clear that the U.S. will take whatever action it deems is necessary, within U.S. law, to protect its national security. Although the U.S. may take note of UK protests and concerns, it does not appear materially to affect their strategy: the rendition programme has revealed aspects of this usually close relationship that are surprising and concerning.

Our intelligence sharing relationship with the U.S. is vital to our efforts to counter the threat to the UK posed by global terrorism. We must remember that attacks against the UK have been disrupted, and lives saved, by intelligence obtained from this relationship. It is therefore to our Agencies credit that since 2004 they have adapted their procedures to work round these problems – to maintain the exchange of intelligence that is so critical to UK security whilst ensuring that individuals are being humanely treated.

Procedures and safeguards have now been formalised and we believe that, in most circumstances, they provide a reasonable level of confidence for the future. We have however recommended that they are strengthened in two areas. First, where despite the use of caveats and assurances there remains a real possibility that sharing intelligence with foreign liaison services might result in torture or mistreatment, current procedure requires that the case is referred to senior management or Ministers for consideration of the risks involved – we recommend that Ministerial approval should be sought in all such cases. Secondly, the Committee considers that “secret detention”, without legal or other representation, is of itself mistreatment. Therefore, where there is a real possibility of “Rendition to Detention” to a secret facility, even if it would be for a limited time, we consider that approval must never be given.

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